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In this paper we examine the use of social media, and especially Twitter, in Iran, Tunisia and Egypt 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This  paper  seeks  to  build  on  an  area  of  work  known  as  emergency  information 
management and, more specifically, on a growing research area referred to as ‘crisis 
informatics’ -- a term coined by Hagar (Hagar, 2007) and extended by Palen, Hughes 
and colleagues (Hughes, Palen, Sutton, Liu, & Vieweg, 2008; Palen, Vieweg, Liu, & 
Hughes, 2009),  among  others.    Emergency (or crisis) communication management 
pertains to the use of communication channels and messages to coordinate activity 
and convey information among citizens, rescue workers, government agencies and 
others.  The  recent  literature  on  crisis  communication  includes  analyses  of 
information  seeking  behavior  following  such  disasters  as  9/11  (Schneider  &  Foot, 
2004),  Hurricane  Katrina  (James  &  Rashed,  2006),  the  Virginia  Tech  shooting 
tragedy April 16, 2007 (Palen et al., 2009; Sheetz, Kavanaugh, Quek, Kim, & Liu, 
forthcoming 2010; Vieweg, Palen, Liu, Hughes, & Sutton, 2008), and various natural 
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disasters,  such  as t h e  e a r t h q u akes  in  Haiti  and  New  Zealand  (Goolsby,  2010),  to 
name just a few.  
Speaking on the role of information and communication technology (ICT), Palen 
and  colleagues  note  that  ‘crisis  informatics’  includes  “empirical  study  as  well  as 
socially and behaviorally conscious ICT development and deployment.  Both research 
and development of ICT for crisis situations need to work from a united perspective 
of the information, disaster, and technical sciences.”  It is the sharing of information 
in a disaster that is especially crucial, and different types of ICT facilitate sharing to 
a greater or lesser degree based on a variety of circumstances.   
In this paper we consider the use of twitter in the mass protests in Iran, Tunisia 
and Egypt and specifically, information sharing among the general public (as opposed 
to  information  sharing  among  rescue  personnel  and/or  government  officials).    We 
compare  the  use  of  twitter  in  prior  studies  of  similar  cases  of  mass  post-election 
protests (Zuckerman, 2009), and types of socially convergent behavior (Hughes et al., 
2008).  The goal is to clarify the use of twitter and the particular gap this technology 
filled. 
2.  SOCIAL MEDIA USE IN CONTEXT  
In thinking about the use of social media during the uprisings in Iran, Tunisia and 
Egypt,  it  is  important  to  keep  in  mind  the  penetration  of  satellite  television,  the 
internet, social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter) and mobile phones.  The diffusion of 
satellite communications and broadcast programs with Middle East news, talk shows 
and political discussion has arguably laid a foundation for rising expectations among 
citizens and local organizations, including the private sector.  London-based Middle 
East Broadcast Corporation introduced entertainment programming of, by and for 
the region.  More importantly, the advent of Al-Jazeera television, based in Qatar 
with  the  24  hour  news  and  feature  stories  in  multiple  languages  (i.e.,  Arabic, 
Turkish, Persian, English), has offered programming that is often critical of Middle 
East regimes and national or regional policies.  In Iran, despite an official ban on 
satellite d i s h  o w n e r s h i p ,  m a n y  m i d d l e  c l a s s  f a m i l i e s  h a v e  t h e m .   G o v e r n m e n t  
confiscations just mean that people have to purchase another dish and install it. 
Internet penetration throughout the Middle East is quite variable; based on 2009 
estimates  by  the  International  Telecommunications  Union  of  the  percent  of  the 
population who use the internet, it was highest in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
(75%), Israel (63%), Oman (51%) and Morocco (41%).  It was lowest in Iraq (1%) Libya 
(6%), and Yemen (10%).  Of the three countries we focus on in this paper, Tunisia is 
highest (34%), followed by Egypt (24%) and Iran (11%).  It is helpful to see these 
percentages in comparison with cell phone (2009) and Facebook penetration (2010) 
shown in see Table 1. 
Table I. Internet, Cell Phone and Facebook Penetration 
  Internet 
(2009) 
Facebook 
(2010) 
Cell Phone 
(2009) 
Tunisia  34  19  95 
Egypt  24  5  67 
Iran  11  FB blocked  71 
Source: Internet and Cell phone data are from the 
International Telecommunications Union Statistics Database 
(2009); Facebook data is for 2010 (Arab Social Media Report, 
2011). 
Facebook users are very few across the region, with the highest percentages in the 
UAE (45%) and Israel (43%).  At 19%, however, Tunisia is among the next highest 
(after Kuwait at 21%).  In Egypt, only 5% of the population uses Facebook, and in 
Iran, the government blocks the site, although many Iranians are able to use proxies.   
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In all these locations, however, the majority of users are young adults, who also make 
up they largest proportion of the adult population in Tunisia, Egypt and Iran.  They 
are not only typically well educated (at least high school diploma), but they are also 
typically without jobs. 
Mobile phone penetration throughout the region is much higher than Facebook or 
the Internet; it is close to full penetration in Tunisia (95%), followed by Iran (71%) 
and Egypt (67%).  In the Gulf States (UAE, Qatar, Kuwait), Saudi Arabia and Israel 
there are more cell phones than citizens (ranging from 232to 125%); even Libya has 
high  penetration  (78%).    Lowest  are  Yemen  (35%)  and  the  Palestinian  territories 
(29%).  It is worth noting that cell phone penetration is also very high in Algeria 
(94%) where there have been some demonstrations in recent weeks.  Mobile phone 
penetration is key to communications from the streets and in crowds not only for 
voice  and  short  message  systems  (SMS),  including  twitter,  but  also  for  capturing 
images and sound on smart phones.  
3.  USE OF TWITTER IN EMERGENCIES 
Twitter, a form of micro-blogging using an open-source web framework called Ruby 
on Rails, is a free, short messaging service established in 2004 by a private company 
based in San Francisco.  The growing research on the use of twitter in emergencies, 
crises or disasters has a short history, given twitter’s short life.  Some of the most 
relevant  work  has  been  done  by  Palen,  Hughes  and  colleagues  on  the  2008 
Hurricanes Gustav and Ike (Hughes & Palen, 2009), the 2007 wild fires in Southern 
California (Hughes et al., 2008), by Zuckerman on the Moldovan election protests in 
Africa  (Zuckerman,  2009),  and  Starbird  and  colleagues  (2010).    These  studies 
specifically focus on the use of twitter in a disaster or crisis situation. Highly relevant 
is the work of Devin Gaffney (2010) and a 2009 study by the Web Ecology Project 
(WEP) that analyzed over 2 million twitter posts (tweets) on the Iran elections that 
WEP collected between June 7 (just before the election) and June 26, 2009.  The 
Gaffney research and the WEP analyses include tweets both inside and outside Iran, 
with the vast majority of tweets being posted from outside Iran. 
The distinction between the analysis by the WEP and our work is that we are 
focused on the use of twitter by citizens in the midst of the crisis situation, that is, 
the streets and alleyways of Iranian cities during the demonstrations.  We treat this 
as  a  crisis  situation  because  after  the  first  demonstration  on  June  13  involving 
millions of people, the protesters were always under threat of attack by uniformed 
police and plainclothes, volunteer militia members (the ‘Basij’). 
Hughes et al report that twitter use under duress and in crisis conditions of the 
two hurricane episodes of Ike and Gustav in 2008 is distinct from routine general 
twitter communication behavior in two ways: 1) fewer tweets are sent as replies to 
other tweets; and 2) fewer URLs are included in the tweet posts.  They surmise that 
this is because in a crisis, people need information broadcast as widely as possible to 
as many people as possible at once (i.e., no need to reply to a specific individual) and 
people  are  less  likely  to  go  to  a  website  for  additional  information  during  the 
emergency.  In the case of Iran, it was difficult for people in Iran to consult the Web, 
because the Internet was extremely slow during the weeks following the elections. 
3.1 Twitter Use in Mass Protests in Iran: June 2009 
The day after the election results were announced in Iran, i.e., on June 13, 2009, a 
crowd estimated at several million people poured into the streets surrounding Azadi 
Square in Tehran.  Eight people who were among a group of protesters who attacked 
a barracks were reported killed by militia from inside the barracks.  Throughout the 
next five days, there were additional (although smaller) mass demonstrations in the  
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streets  that  were  relatively  peaceful,  culminating  in  a  large  demonstration  in 
Teheran on Thursday, June 18, to mourn those who had been killed or injured earlier 
week.    On  Friday,  June  19,  one  week  after  the  elections,  the  Supreme  Leader 
Ayatollah Khamenei announced during his Friday prayer sermon that the election 
results  would  stand  (with  the  announced  winner  as  incumbent  President 
Ahmadinejad) and that any further protests would be considered illegal. 
Throughout  the  weeks  following  the  disputed  election  results,  the  government 
tightened control over data networks and Internet gateways, such that traffic over 
them was reduced to a crawl.  Various social Internet sites were blocked, including 
Twitter, Facebook and eventually Youtube.  Voice of America Persian, a US funded 
satellite  television  network,  broadcast  proxy  IP  sites  so  citizens  could  connect  to 
blocked sites, and upload or download pictures and videos of recent street protests.  A 
Twitter  data  collection  by  Gaffney  (2010)  for  this  period  indicated  that  the 
overwhelming number of tweeters were, in fact, outside Iran.  
Iranian citizens used a mix of interpersonal and mediated communication to get 
and compare information, about the election results, the opposition or government’s 
response, what had been happening in the streets, and whether, when and where 
additional protests were being called.  Taxi drivers were a particularly good source of 
information on whether and where there were protests planned during this period. 
There are several reasons why the use of twitter was particularly important in 
the case of the Iran street protests: 1) the governments had blocked access to the 
twitter website, so it was only accessible via a proxy server or a text message on a 
mobile phone, and 2) protesters often needed information ‘on-the-fly’ while they were 
in the streets, to avoid clashes with police and plainclothes militia.  So they used 
their mobile phones not only to take pictures or videos, but also to share information 
about what was happening at that moment and specific location, such as which street 
to avoid due to heavy police presence.  This was also the case for Tunisia and Egypt. 
3.2 Twitter Use in Tunisia: December 2010 
Twitter as well as Facebook appeared to play a key role in spreading information in 
Tunisia at the outset of the unrest in response to the suicide by self-immolation of a 
young street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, in the town of Sidi Bouzid.  According to 
Ryan  (2011)  reporting  for  Al-Jazeera,  Rochdi  Horchni,  a  relative  of  Mohamed 
Bouazizi said protesters took to the streets with “a rock in one hand, and a cell phone 
in the other.”  
The  Facebook  statistical  portal  (Socialbakers) c l a i m s  t h e  p e n e t r a t i o n  r a t e  o f  
Facebook  in  Tunisia  is  only  about 1 9 % ,  b u t  i n  c o m b i n a t i o n  w i t h  o t h e r  c h a n n e l s ,  
including  face-to-face,  TV  and  phone,  it  helped  to  notify  others  of  events  and  to 
coordinate initial street demonstrations.  The Tunisian government blocked access to 
the Internet in early December, thereby restricting use of Facebook, Twitter (on the 
web) and YouTube (until Jan 13, 2011).  Subsequently,  President  Ben  Ali  tried  to 
calm the population by promising to unblock access to Internet Web sites.  Ben Ali 
fled Tunisia on January 14.  Figures 1 and 2 shows charts (proportion of tweets per 
tweeting  individual  or  organization)  and  trends  (tweet  frequency  per  day)  for 
Tunisia.    We  collected  and  analyzed 6 5 , 7 4 8  tweets  (using  #SidiBouzid,  #tunisia, 
#tunileaks) from January 1, 2011 to February 1, 2011 and produced visualizations 
using Desktop Archivist and web-based Archivist. 
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Figure 1. Top Users by Tweet Count (#SidiBouzid) 
 
The  most  frequent  tweeters  (twitter  users  posting  messages  or  ‘tweets’)  were  not 
necessarily in the country.  There is a large majority (almost 63%) of our collected 
tweets that are retweets (original tweets that are copied by other tweeters and sent 
out under their twitter account as ‘retweets’).  This pattern is a likely indication of 
users outside Tunisia forwarding on messages from users inside the country.  There 
were clear peaks in the volume of tweets in January on the 9th, 10th, 12th and 14th 
(President Ben Ali left the country on the 14th of January). 
The protests in Tunisia inspired similar street demonstrations across the Middle 
East, the largest of which have been in Egypt.  The unrest in Libya continues as of 
mid-March, but there is a near black-out of communication media of all kinds. 
3.3 Twitter Use in Egypt: January 2011 
Egypt  is  the  most  populous  Arab  country  with  almost  85  million  inhabitants.  
Massive  protests  building  throughout  January  2011  (primarily  in  Cairo  and 
Alexandria, the two largest cities) called for an end to the 30-year reign of President 
Hosni Mubarak with complaints of corruption, unemployment and lack of democracy. 
The Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Survey conducted April 12 - May 7, 2010 
showed  a  majority  of  59%  of  Egyptian  Muslims  reported  that  they  believed 
democracy  was  preferable  to a n y  o t h e r  k i n d  o f  g o v e r n m e n t .  The  street 
demonstrations  seemed  to  reflect  this  kind  of  sentiment  for  the  most  part.    The 
demonstrations were clearly a crisis situation for citizens, as several hundred deaths 
were reported from the initial crackdown by pro-Mubarak forces. 
The Egyptian government quickly cut off access to the Internet and restricted the 
flow of cell phone network traffic.  For example, a ReTweet (RT) on the day of the 
million  man  march  (February  1)  for e x a m p l e  s a y s ,  “ R T  @Dima_Khatib:  Mobiles 
around Tahrir Square are not working any more. Blocked too. Like internet #egypt 
#jan25 #cairo”. Nonetheless, a stream of communications, including tweets, managed 
to  find  their  way  out  of  the  country.    We  collected  and  analyzed    tweets  (using 
common hashtags including #jan25, #cairo, #egypt, #elbaradei) from January 28 to 
February 14, 2011 and produced visualizations using the Desktop Archivist and web-
based Archivist tool.  Just a collection of 500 tweets from the day of the million man 
march shows diverse sources of tweets, half of which are web-based, suggesting they 
are sent from outside Egypt.  
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A focus on tweets just before until just after Mubarak’s resignation, February 7 – 
14,  2011,  with  514,782  posts,  shows a  c l e a r  s p i k e  i n  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  d u r i n g  k e y  
events (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Tweet Volume Over Time: Egypt (Feb 7-14, 2011) 
 
A tag cloud presentation of the 83,745 twitter posts on February 8 (with hashtag 
#jan25, although many posts include multiple tags, such as #Egypt, #Mubarak, #El 
Baradei, #Tahrir) the day that activist Wael Ghonim roused protesters, shows the 
most common terms that appeared (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. Tag Cloud of Top Tweets February 8, 2011 
 
Wael Ghonim is a prominent Egyptian activist who, among other communications, 
created the Facebook page (anonymously at first) called “We are all Khaled Said” –  
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named after a young Egyptian who was brutally murdered by police allegedly for 
capturing police corruption on video.  The Facebook page gained much attention in 
the weeks leading up to the demonstrations in Tahrir Square, Cairo (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. Facebook page: We are all Khaled Said, created by Wael Ghonim 
 
Changes  in  the  predominance  of  terms  appearing  in  tweets  with  these  hashtags 
during  the  week  of  February  7-14,  2011  indicate  the  changing  focus  of 
communication among users as events unfolded and led up to Mubarak’s February 
10th radio address in which he announces he will not resign (Figure 4 left), followed 
the  next  day,  Friday,  February  11,  2011, w i t h  Egypt’s  Vice  President  Suleiman 
announcing that Mubarak has resigned (Figure 5, right). 
 
 
Figure 5. On left: Tag Cloud of Tweets: Mubarak radio address refusing to resign (Feb 10);  
On right: Vice President announces Mubarak has resigned (Feb 11) 
 
The location of tweeters is sometimes indicated (optionally) in a user’s profile.  A 
listing of the top tweeters locations, excluding ‘not reported’ and Arabic words  
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(not captured by Archivist) in Egypt just during the week of February 7-14, 2011 
is shown in Table 2. 
 
Table. 2. Location and Frequency of Top Tweeters  
Location  Frequency 
Egypt  63255 
London  5921 
Kuwait  5415 
USA  4697 
iPhone:  2925 
dubai  2347 
Earth  2004 
Jordan  1918 
Canada  1789 
NYC  1785 
UK  1760 
Jeddah  1691 
Paris  1665 
los angeles  1644 
Lebanon  1630 
Saudi Arabia  1592 
 
We have collapsed all locations within Egypt into one category in Table 2 for the sake 
of clarity and comparison; users indicate their location in multiple ways (e.g., Egypt; 
Cairo,  Egypt;  Cairo;  Alexandria,  Egypt).    The  top  location  of  Egypt  would  have 
presumably many more users if we were able to show the users who indicated their 
location in Arabic.  What is important to note is that the highest frequency of tweets 
is  within  Egypt,  whereas  in  the  case  of  Iran  during  the  June  2009  post-election 
demonstrations, there were fewer than 100 estimated twitter users inside Iran.  The 
bulk of the tweeting was being done by users outside Iran, often re-tweeting posts 
from users inside the country. 
4.  COMPARISON WITH OTHER CASES 
The Iranian government appeared to have restricted cell phone use in areas of the 
Tehran  where  protests  were  taking  place  (around  Azadi  Square,  along  Vali  Asr 
street,  and  Ferdowsi  Square)  and  in  Cairo  (around  Tahrir  Square)  by  limiting 
bandwidth on cell phone towers that serve those areas.  This government control was 
also reported in the mass street protests in Moldova and in Belarus.  By shutting 
down  cell p h o n e  s e r v i c e ,  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  c a n  r e d u c e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  p r o t e s t o r s  
receiving  messages  via  mobile  phone  while  in  the  streets  where  protests  are 
underway.  This also eliminates protesters’ ability to send and receive twitter posts, 
and  other  SMS  messages.    The  Iranian  Ministry  of  Telecommunications  reported 
that it shut down Internet-based message services during the Iranian elections in 
2006  (local  elections)  because  it  was  not  possible  to  identify  users,  whereas  the 
content of SMS messages sent via cell phones was not shut down completely because 
subscribers  could  be  easily  identified  (Zuckerman,  2009).  T h i s  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  
senders and receivers benefits police intelligence.  
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In the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, the government shut down Internet access, 
although briefly, in an attempt to squelch communication among citizens with each 
other and with the outside world.  On January 25, 2011 about 5:20 pm, Internet 
traffic  to  and  from  Egypt  across  80  Internet  Service  Providers  (ISPs)  around  the 
world  dropped  precipitously ( t h e  f o u r  m a i n  I S P s  a r e  L i n k  E g y p t ,  V o d a f o n e / F a y a ,  
Telecom Egypt, and Etisalat Misr). Close to 97% of Egyptian Internet traffic was 
reported lost, according to Julien Coulon, co-founder of Cedexis, a French Internet 
performance monitoring and traffic management system.  The one exception, Noor 
Group, still had 83 live routes to its Egyptian customers, possibly out of technical 
incompetence on the part of the Egyptian Ministry of Post and Telephone in shutting 
down  the  gateway,  or  possibly  because  the  Egyptian  Stock  Exchange  has  a  Noor 
address (http://www.egyptse.com).  Despite the loss of Internet access to most users, 
some  Egyptians  were  able  to  gain  intermittent  Internet  access  via  international 
telephone (dial-up) connections. 
It  is  not  technically  difficult  to  disrupt  mobile  phone  service,  as  the  Egyptian 
government also did on Friday, January 28; it simply ordered the Egyptian operator 
ECMS to shut off service, especially in the main demonstration areas of Cairo and 
Alexandria.    Mobile  phone  signals  were  patchy  and  text  messages  inoperative.  
Throughout the ordeals of both Egypt and Tunisia, however, Al-Jazeera continued to 
broadcast live television programming  (with  very  brief  disruption  in  Cairo)  which 
was also available over the Internet. 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
The use of ICT during the mass demonstrations and street protests in post-election 
Iran, and in Tunisia and Egypt, as with similar protests, can be considered crisis 
informatics in social convergence events.  It is a crisis in that people are sometimes 
under attack from police or plainclothes militia, and are always under the threat of 
attack based on past experience.  The street protests are social convergence events, 
insofar as a large number of people are communicating with each other in proximity 
and with people in more distant locations (home, other parts of the city, other cities, 
abroad) who have an interest in what the individual participant is seeing and doing.  
Given the finding of Hughes and colleagues (Hughes & Palen, 2009) that people who 
adopted  twitter  during  a  crisis  or  social  convergence  event  continued  to  use  the 
service, and given the ongoing demonstrations and protests in the region, we can 
expect to see increasing use of twitter for crisis communication and response in Iran, 
Tunisia and Egypt.   
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